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This investigation proposes a simplified concept for the rapid field design 
of protective structures, subject to attack by conventional artillery rounds, 
mortar rounds and small rockets. 
Parameters which should be considered during a rigorous design process 
are discussed. The number and complexity of these parameters make the rigor-
ous design procedure too unwieldy to be efficiently used, in a limited time period, 
when materials are not available to comply with Standard Designs. 
Since the duration of an explosion pulse is very short and uncompacted soil 
is capable of absorbing explosive energy, this study investigates the theory that 
adequate protection can be provided by structures designed by considering only 
four easily understood and readily determined parameters. These include the 
radius of destruction of the explosive projectile; the unit weight of the soil to be 
used in overhead cover; the size of the structure; and the spacing of structural 
members commensurate with the grade, species and dimensions of available 
timber. 
Tests were conducted using both small-scale and full-scale structures. In 
each case, the radius of destruction of the explosive charge was measured in the 
soil used for overhead cover and determined analytically using empirical rela-
tionships. The structures were designed to support a depth of earth cover 
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slightly exceeding the larger radius of destruction. Size and spacing of the 
structural members were determined by considering the grade and species of 
lumber used for construction, the unsupported span of the structural member, 
dimensions and section properties of the timber, and the uniformly distributed 
load applied to the structure by the soil cover. The results generally support 
the design concept and warrant further study under actual firing conditions. 
Conclusions include the following: 
L Consideration of the rigorous parameters involved in dynamic load 
determination may be replaced by relatively simple field observations and de-
sign aids. 
2. Because of the nature of the load pulse, for projectiles assumed in this 
study, the simple and easily understood parameters of required soil cover, the 
dead load caused by this cover, and the physical and mechanical properties of 
construction materials are sufficient for the design of protective structures 
subject to attack by these projectiles. 
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PREFACE 
The general idea for this investigation was conceived during this writer's 
military service with the U.S. Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Republic 
of Vietnam, first as Commanding Officer of Company A, 8th Engineer Battalion, 
and later as the Assistant Operations Officer of that battalion. 
Each U.S. Army Division has an organic Engineer Battalion. These mili-
tary engineers perform a wide variety of tasks in support of military operations. 
One of these tasks is assisting elements of a division in the construction of pro-
tective structures. The Engineer Battalion's organization provides for subor-
dinate elements to actually perform, or at least supervise, construction tasks 
while planning is done by members of the battalion staff. The design of pro-
tective structures and required bills of materials are usually prepared by the 
Assistant Operations Officer of the battalion. 
Each Infantry Brigade, within a division, is normally supported by one 
Combat Engineer Company from the Engineer B8ttalion. The mission of the 
Engineer Company is similar to that of the Engineer B::1tta1ion, except on a 
smaller scale. With regard to construction tasks, the relationship between the 
battalion and the company might be compared to that of the Architect or Design 
Engineer to the General Contractor. The Engineer Company actually performs 
or supervises construction, using plans and specifications prepared at the bat-
talion leve 1. 
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In an extremely fluid situation, involving redep1oynwnt, the Engineer Com-
pany, moving with its supported brigade, may be separated from the Engineer 
Battalion Headquarters by such considerable distances that even radio communi-
cations ~~ re not possible. In this case field changes in protective structure de-
signs must be made by the engineer officer responsible for construction, based 
on his experience and engineering judgement. 
Standard Designs prove to be little more than a guide unless all of the n1aterials 
specified by the bill of materials 3 re on hand. Receipt of so many board feet of 
lumber may not mean receipt of the various sizes of timbers required for the 
posts or stringers of the protective structure. When this happens, design changes, 
or a complete redesign, must be made based on materials available. These 
changes, or redesign, must be accomplished quickly by the officer responsible 
for the construction or by someone more familiar with the design of protective 
structures. Time is a factor which must be considered in this situation, 3S 
Tactical Commanders usually desire that their Operations Centers, First Aid 
Stations, etc., be constructed and placed in operation as soon as possible after 
oCC\lpying a new area. Even if the distance to the Battalion Headquarters is 
relatively short, the Engineer Company Commander may not h3ve time to send 
back for design changes or a new design, which will utili?:e his inventory of 
available construction materials. 
The comments of the preceding paragraphs and those contained in the re-
mainder of this thesis are not intended as criticisms of the U.S. Armed Forces 
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logistics system, nor do they imply :J shortage of cap~1ble personnel within the 
Corps of Engineers. They are based upon the experiences of one individual 
during a one year period. Their only intent is to reflect problems and pressures, 
which may be encountered by personnel during field construction under adverse 
conditions. As a result of these experiences, it is believed that a simple and 
rational method of rapid field design, or revision, to provide desired protection 
with field available materials would be of value to other military engineers faced 
with similar problems. This is the basis upon which this investigation was 
initiated. 
The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the financial assistance 
rendered by the University of Missouri - Rolla during the course of this inves-
tigation and to numerous faculty members who have given freely of their time 
and resources to answer questions or make available reference books and/ or 
necessary equipment during the pursuance of this research. 
The writer is extremely grateful for assistance provided by Mr. ,J. T. Ballard 
and other personnel at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment 
Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi; and by Major Ronald K. \Vhitlock and other n1 em-
bers of the First Advanced Individual Training Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, 
Missouri. 
The writer would like to express his particular appreciation for the assistance 
and guidance of his advisor, Dr. Jack H. Emanuel, during the course of this 
investigation and the preparation of this manuscript. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Having faced the problems of protective structure design and construction 
as the engineer officer responsible for construction and later as the officer 
responsible for design, the writer feels that a simplified concept for the rapid 
field design of protective structures would be extremely useful. The procedure 
should be sufficiently simple to allow complete understanding by personnel not 
specifically trained in engineering; it should minimize the variables involved 
in design; and it should provide for field changes without altering the desired 
degree of protection. Standard Designs will continue to be useful as a basis 
for requisitioning construction materials and if the complete list is received, 
the structure may be built without changes. 
Among the parameters to be considered in the rigorous design of protective 
structures are the size of the enemy projectile which might strike the structure, 
the type of overhead cover to be used, the desired size of the protective structure, 
the reaction of its members to dynamic loads, and, of course, available materials. 
The size and type of the onticipated enemy projectile introduces the great-
est degree of uncertainty in a design of this sort. Projectiles which detonate 
upon impact cause a particular loading on the structure; those which have delfly 
fusing cause a different type loading, lasting for a longer period of time; and 
those few that do not detonate, the "duds," cause still another loading condition. 
The loading caused by exploding projectiles is primarily a function of the pro-
perties of the particular explosive contained in the projectile. These pro-
perties may or may not be available through intelligence channels. Even if 
the explosive's properties are known, there are rel3tively few :Jvailable 
people who have the ability to use them in the determination of a design load-
ing for the protective structure. 
The type of overhead cover will require additional considerations. The 
unit weight of the soil used for the cover will contribute significantly to the 
de:Jd load applied to the structure. The dry unit weight or the saturated unit 
weight of most soils is not difficult to determine. Depending on whether or not 
materials are available to keep the soil dry, a reasonably accurate determina-
tion of the dead load due to soil cover c;Jn be made. The use of coarse rocks, 
logs, or steel matting to c:Juse detonation at or very ne:Jr the top surface of 
the final structure will also contribute to the dead load on the structure, but 
this contribution is usually very easily determined. However, the energy 
absorbing characteristics of these materials 3 nd the particular soil, in either 
a dry or a wet condition, are not generally known except, possibly, by those 
persons whose particular are;J of interest is in Soil Mechanics or Soil Dynamics. 
The size of the structure depends upon its type, the intended use, D nd, 
perhaps most important, the materials available for construction. A statica 11~, 
indeterminate structure is usually more economical from the standpoint of 
materials, but experience and training of the persons responsible for design 
or construction may lead to the use of a more easily analyzed statically deter-
minate structure. Also, rigorous consideration of dynamic loads on the 
structure may be beyond the expertise of the designer. 
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Protection against aerial bombs, which may contain from one hundred 
to more than two thousand pounds of high explosives, requires the construction 
of extremely hardened protective structures. Often constructed of thick, re-
inforced concrete, even these structures are deeply buried to afford an ac-
ceptable degree of protection. In a situation where the friendly forces enjoy 
air superiority, or the enemy's Cflpabilities are limited to mortars, conven-
tional artillery and relatively small rockets, the requirement for such har-
dened and deeply buried structures may be reduced. 
It is extremely difficult to make general statements which will apply to 
every situation in which the military engineer may find himself. For the 
purpose of this investigation, the following basic assumptions are made: 
1. Enemy projectiles are limited to conventional artillery rounds, m or-
tar rounds and small rockets, which contain on the order of fifty pounds, or 
less, of high explosives. 
2. The enemy projectiles used are all fused to detonate upon impact, or 
the percentage of those with delay fusing is sufficiently small so that the assump-
tion of impact detonation is within the limits of acceptable risk. 
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3. Construction priorities and availability of materials preclude the 
use of reinforced concrete and structural steel in the construction of pro-
tective structures. Timber will be used as the primary structural members. 
The enemy projectile, or design round, against which protection is de-
sired may be specified by the local Tactical Commander, or the size may be 
determined based on recent enemy activity or intelligence reports as to enemy 
capabilities within the Area of Operations. Once the design round has been 
determined, an analysis of craters which this round causes in the local soil, 
when it impacts and detonates, should be made. If there are no available 
craters which have been caused by enemy rounds, analysis of craters caused 
by similar friendly rounds should provide sufficiently accurate information as 
to the effects of the design round. For example, the effects of a U.S. Slmm 
mortar round should compare favorably to those of an enemy 82mm mortar round, 
as should the effects of a U.S. 155mm artillery round compare to those of an 
enemy 152mm artillery round. The crater analysis will provide the designer 
with information regarding the effects of the design round on the particular 
soil he intends to use as cover for the protective structure. The specific items 
of interest, when making the crater analysis, are the determination of the 
crater depth and radius. It must be emphasized that it is the true crater depth 
and radius that should be measured (Fig. 1). The observed crater will have 
an apparent depth and radius. However, the true depth and radius should be 
determined by gently excavating the loose soil from the crater. The measured 
true crater depth and radius gives the designer an idea as to the minimum depth 
'~ ,-
..,. .......... ---
~. . . . . ' 
DT 
DA 
FALLBACK ZONE ""'(_ ~~-:'. :" ..... - .l /: • • "• y HT 
• . . : : . . .--: . . . . = ·y· . . \ I 
/ "-• ·. . ....... ·. 
""" • ••- I HA = Apparent Crater 
DA = Apparent Crater Diameter 
HT = True Crater Depth 
DT = True Crater Diameter 
RT = }coT) = True Crater Radius 
Figure 1. Typical Crater, Showing Apparent and True Dimensions. 
CJ1 
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of soil cover which must be used. 
The intent of this investigation is to determine the feasibility of limiting 
the variables involved in protective structure design to the required depth of 
overhead cover and the selection and spacing of structural members. By 
analyzing the true crater caused by the design round, the effects of the ex-
ploding projectile and the energy absorbing characteristics of the soil are 
measured relatively, and the designer need not have specific training in soil 
mechanics or a complete knowledge of the effects of high explosives. 
The true crater depth or radius, whichever is greater, gives an indication 
of the minimum depth of overhead cover required on the structure. The 
theoretical radius of destruction, as determined from empirical relationships, 
and the measured depth or radius of the actual true crater should be compared 
and the larger value selected. The selected radius of destruction and applied 
factors of safety will enable the designer to determine the required depth of 
overhead cover. This depth and the unit weight of the soil, in either a dry or 
a. saturated state, are used to compute the uniformly distributed dead load 
which will be applied to the structure. Determination of the required size 
and spacing of structural members may then be done in the usual manner based 
on available materials and the designer's ability to analyze either statically 
indeterminate or determinate structures. 
Standard Designs should be used for the construction of protective structures 
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whenever the required materials are available, as they provide maximum 
protection for personnel and the most efficient use of materials. This inves-
tigation is intended only to supplement these designs by providing an easily 
understood procedure which may be rapidly applied, if materials are not 
available to comply strictly with the Standard Design. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Although it is highly unlikely that this investigation can be considered nnew 
work, n available information, dealing specifically with protection against 
conventional artillery rounds or relatively small explosive projectiles, was 
found to be limited. Information sources range from texts dealing with specific 
topics related to the investigation, to Field Manuals and Technical Reports 
published by the Department of the Army, to communications with the writer's 
military associates, and, finally, the writer's personal experiences and 
observations. 
A. Standard Designs 
The U. S. Army's Field Manuals on Field Fortifications (1) and Engineer 
Field Data (2) contain information and bill of materials for the construction of 
protective structures. The structures shown, however, are generally too small 
for use as First Aid Stations or Operations Centers, and anticipate the extremely 
severe loading of a direct hit of a 155mm, fuse-delay projectile. Both 
references discuss the use of a cushion -layer, n •.. of dry untamped earth ... to 
absorb the shock of detonation ... , " and the use of a burster layer, n ... of 15 
to 20cm rocks or 20cm logs, wired tightly together, in two layers ... to cause 
detonation of the projectile before it can penetrate to the lower ... layers. n 
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B. Parameters for Rigorous Design 
As stated previously, to even attempt a rigorous protective structure 
design would require knowledge of the properties of the explosive charge 
contained in the design round, knowledge of the particular characteristics of the 
soil to be used as overhead cover, and some degree of proficiency in the analysis 
and design of structures subject to dynamic loading. 
The writings of Baum (3 ), which include references to many other world-
wide authors, most notably those of Zeldovich and Kompaneyets (4), show that 
explosion pressures are directly proportional to the density of the explosive 
and the square of the detonating velocity. The explosion impulse is directly 
proportional to the cross-sectional area and length of the explosive charge and 
the density and detonating velocity of the explosive. The time of the pulse is 
related to the length of explosive charge and detonating velocity, and is given by 




t = The duration of the pulse, in seconds. 
,t =The length of the explosive charge, in feet. 
(1) 
D= The detonating velocity of the explosive, in feet per second. 
Once the explosion pulse, based on pressure and area of influence, and time of 
the pulse are determined, analysis of the effects on the soil cover and the actual 
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structure may be made. 
The pressure at some depth below the soil surface may be determined 
analytically, using the Boussinesq Method for evaluating soil pressure. A 
discussion of this and other methods is available in almost any text on Soil 
Mechanics or Foundation Analysis, such as those by Sowers (5) and Bowles (6). 
It must be noted that these texts are concerned with Soil Mechanics and Founda-
tion Analysis and Design and deal with static loads applied to the soil by founda-
tions, rather than dynamic loads of explosions. In addition, the Boussinesq 
Theory contains several simplifying assumptions, such as weightless soil--which 
is elastic, homogeneous, semi-infinite, and isotropic and obeys Hooke's Law--
and that stress distribution is symmetrical with respect to the vertical axis. 
These assumptions greatly simplify the mathematical relationships used in the 
Boussinesq Theory, but may give inaccurate values in the case of dynamic loads. 
The pressure at some depth, as determined in this manner could, at most, be 
used only as a guide. In this case the designer is dealing with a dynamic rather 
than a static load and this load is rarely applied in a vertical direction, due to 
the trajectory of the incoming round. 
In order to select structural members, the designer needs to know maximum 
loads and/or deflections to which the members may be subjected. A theoretical 
determination of the deflection of a structural member caused by an explosion 
pulse may be made based on procedures shown by Biggs (7), Rogers (8), and 
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Burton (9) 
In order to determine the maximum deflection of a member subjected to 
dynarr:ic loading, the designer must know the magnitude and duration of the 
pulse, the natural frequency of the structure and, of course, the span length, 
modulus of elasticity and moment of inertia of the member being deflected. 
A general expression commonly used indicates that the dynamic deflection 
equals the product of a Dynamic Load Factor, D. L. F. , times the deflection, 
X . , caused by a static load equivalent in magnitude to the dynamic load. In 
statw 
equation form: 
X = (D. L. F.) (X tat· ) s lC (2) 
The static deflection is determined using common formulas for deflection within 
the elastic range of the material used. The Dynamic Load Factor for a tri-
angular pulse, which the explosion pulse is ideally assumed to be, may be 
determined by solving the differential equations of motion for the structure, or 
may be taken from graphs similar to those shown in Appendix A. 
C. Radius of Destruction 
Prentiss (10) and Wessman and Rose (11) discuss formulas, used on the 
European Continent, which give a value for the radius of destruction caused by 
an impacting and exploding projectile. While the equations are applicable, in 
the strictest sense, to the effects of aerial bombs which conta.tn one hundred 
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pounds, or more, of high explosive, some of the factors which must be considered 
may be extended to this investigation. For aerial bombs, these factors include 
the weight of the explosive charge, the proportion of the charge below the ground 
surface, a coefficient for the medium, and a tamping coefficient. Whereas this 
investigation assumes projectiles which detonate upon impact, at or very near the 
ground surface, an expression applicable to bombs must consider penetration 
since the impact velocity of bombs may exceed 1000 feet per second, and some 
penetration will take place in the few milliseconds between initiation and actual 
detonation of the projectile. The radius of destruction of a bomb may be calcu-
lated from the following expression (10, p. 42 and 11, p. 124): 
where 
R~2.5~ (3) 
R = Radius of destruction, in feet. 
C =Weight of explosive, in pounds. 
ex. = A coefficient for the medium in which detonation takes place; 
for earth it is 0. 7. 
f3 =Proportion of the charge below ground surface. 
5 =A tamping coefficient, which varies from 1. 0, for complete 
penetration, to 3. 5, for incomplete penetration. 
The total depth of destruction is found by combining R, from Equation 3, the 
depth of penetration, if any, and the distance from the center of gravity of the 
explosive charge to the nose of the projectile. The minimum depth of cover may 
then be determined as: 
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D = R + (h- a) (4) 
where 
D = Required depth of cover, in feet. 
R = Radius of destruction, in feet. 
h =Depth of penetration, in feet. 
a =Distance from center of gravity of the charge to the nose of the 
projectile, in feet. 
It is important to note that, according to Wessman and Rose (11, pp. 124-125), 
" ••• in the development of this formula, the assumption was made that only that 
part [of the bomb] which is below the ground surface is effective in producing a 
crater." 
The Field Manual on Explosives and Demolitions (12) presents the following 
equation, known as the Breaching Formula: 
where 
P = Pounds of TNT required. 
R =Breaching radius, in feet. 
K = Material factor. 
C = Tamping factor. 
Rearranging in the form of Equation 3: 




For good timber and earth construction, the value of K may be taken as 0. 23. 
Values for C vary from 2. 3, for surface detonation, to 1. 25, for complete 
penetration into the overhead cover. 
D. Relative Effectiveness of Explosives 
It should be noted that the Breaching Formula was derived for the explosive 
TNT. No mention was made as to the type of explosive used in Equation 3 for 
calculation of the radius of destruction. However, the time period (1935-1942) 
would lead one to believe that TNT, or some less powerful explosive, was the 
assumed explosive in the derivation of this expression. The differences in the 
effectiveness of TNT and the newer explosives, such as Composition B, may 
be easily considered, using the Relative Effectiveness of explosives. Notes 
taken in lectures and handouts distributed by Ash (13, 14) during a course in 
Explosives Engineering, Mining 307, taken as a part of the writer's graduate 
course work show that the Relative Effectiveness of one explosive to another 
may be determined by considering the ratio of the explosives' density and 
square of their detonating velocity. In other words: 
(7) 
where 
= The Relative Effectiveness of Explosive 2 to that of Explosive 1. 
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p1 & p 2 ==The density of the respective explosives. 
D1 & D2 == The detonating velocity of the respective explosives. 
These handouts included the approximate density and range of detonating velocity 
for most of the high explosives used by the military, as shown in Table I. 
Table I. Density and Detonating Velocity 
of Common Military Explosives. 
Density, in grams Detonating Velocity, 
Explosive per cubic in feet per second 
centimeter 
TNT 1.0 20000-23000 
Composition B 1.6 25000-26000 
Composition C-4 1.5 26000-27000 
PETN 1.2-1.6 22000-24000 
By using the expression for Relative Effectiveness, one may consider a specific 
explosive when using either Equation 3 or Equation 6 to determine the radius of 
destruction. Calculation of Relative Effectiveness is necessary if the explosive 
contained in the projectile, against which protection is desired, is not TNT, or 
values may be taken directly from Explosives and Demolitions (12, pp. 83-84). 
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E. Cratering Effects of 81mm Mortar Rounds and 155mm Artillery Rounds 
Cratering effects of 81mm mortar rounds and 155mm artillery rounds, exploded 
at the ground surface, have been investigated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, as reported by Carre (15). 
The referenced rounds were statically detonated and their orientation varied from 
vertical, to forty-five degrees, to horizontal. The soil at the test area was a 
coarse sand. In a cohesionless soil it would be difficult to determine the true 
crater dimensions; however, the apparent crater dimensions for these rounds are 
shown in Table II. 
Table II. Apparent Crater Measurements for Surface 
Detonated 81mm Mortar and 155mm Artillery Rounds. 
Type Orientation Apparent Depth, Average Apparent 
in feet Diameter, in feet 
81mm Vertical 0.9 2.7 
81mm 45° 0.8 3.8 
81mm Horizontal 0.6 3.4 
155mm Vertical 1.1 4. 8 
155mm 45° 1.1 7.4 
155mm Horizontal 1.4 6.7 
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Since the trajectory of an incoming ronnd usually causes the angle of impact to be 
greater than forty degrees, the data obtained for the horizontal orientation might 
be neglected. The average apparent depth and diameter of the crater caused by the 
81mm are then 0.85 feet and 3.25 feet, respectively. The average apparent depth 
and diameter of the crater caused by the 155mm round becomes 1.1 feet and 6.1 
feet, respectively. It is interesting to compare these measured apparent crater 
data with the theoretical values for radius of destruction, as calculated using 
Equation 3 and Equation 6. One should certainly expect these values to be less 
than the calculated values, since these are apparent dimensions. Calculations and 
comparisons are shown on pages 25-29. 
F. Construction Materials 
Discussions with the writer's military associates, such as Primmer (16) and 
Hill (17 ), confirm that others have used timber as the primary material for 
protective structures construction. The basic assumption that construction 
priorities cause timber to be the most readily available material for this type of 
construction appears valid. In addition, due to the urgency of the situation and 
priorities established for equipment utilization, the additional fabrication time and 
equipment required for reinforced concrete or structural steel construction often 
cause the use of these materials to be less practical than timber. 
Wood is an extremely good material for this type of construction due, primarily, 
to its ability to absorb increased loads which act for short periods of time. A 
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discussion of the mechanical properties of wood and allowable stresses for various 
loading conditions is presented by Scofield and O'Brien (18) and Wangaard (19). Of 
primary importance to the design of protective structures are the allowable stress 
reductions for unseasoned timber, defects in the wood, or continuous loading due 
to the earth. According to Scofield and O'Brien (18, p. 11): 
In most wood structures the long time loading induces a stress 
less than 90% of that permitted for Normal Loading and, there-
fore, need not be checked separately. Under exceptional condi-
tions such as structures subject to continuous maximum earth 
or water pressure, the design should be investigated for long 
time maximum loading using working stresses 90% of those used 
for Normal Loading. 
If lmots or other defects are present in members, allowable stress reductions 
should definitely be made. In the case of continuous earth loading the ten percent 
reduction in allowable stress is highly recommended by the writer, even if the 
earth cover does not stress the member to its allowable limit. 
G. Experimental Models 
To avoid the expense of full-size protective structures and the requirements 
for artillery pieces, or at least mortars, the use of a model for the initial portion 
of the investigation was considered. Murphy (20), discusses the use of pre-
diction equations and their application to true and/or distorted models. Particular 
note is made of the fact that certain difficulties may be encountered if one expects 
the dead load stresses and distortions to have the same relative effects in both the 
model and the prototype. Pertinent to this investigation, Murphy (20, pp. 80, 
163) states: 
If the length scale is to be greater than 1, the material in the 
model must be proportionately heavier or less stiff or both . 
. . . the duration of the applied impulse in the model must be 
reduced in comparison with that in the prototype if similarity 
is to exist. That is, the impulse must be "sharper" in the 
model. 
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The first requirement can be met without great difficulty, by proper selection of 
building materials for the model and proper compensation for weight. The second 
requirement causes considerable difficulty in that controlling or properly 
reducing the duration of the impulse on the model is almost impossible. The 
duration of the impulse on the prototype for the particular type of loading being 
investigated is extremely short and to obtain even "sharper" impulses would 
require the use of extremely short lengths of explosive charge, or the use of an 
explosive with a considerably higher detonating velocity, or both. Thus, the 
design of small-scale structures, as either true or distorted models, was not 
attempted. 
The Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, was visited as 
a part of this investigation. Ballard (21) reported that small-scale structures 
are used in some of the testing conducted at that facility. However, these are 
used only to observe effects and are not normally used to attempt to accurately 
predict the action of a prototype. During this visit several segments of high 
speed photographic films were observed, which showed the effects of explosions 
on sections of small-scale roof slabs constructed of reinforced concrete. The 
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observed failure mechanism appeared to be a prmching shear failure rather than a 
flexural failure. This failure mechanism did not occur when adequate depths of 
soil were used over the slab. For soil depths less than this amormt, the 
explosion pulse caused a failure that, at least initially, could best be described 
as "someone prmching his fist through the slab~" Naturally, once the reinforcing 
bars were cut, the remainder of the slab failed and fell. The true failure 
mechanism, due to such a short term loading, would have been difficult to 
observe without the use of high speed photography. 
High speed photography supports the comments of Wessman and Rose (11), 
made in early 1942, that bending of a beam caused by a short duration explosion 
load would be very localized. They compared the distinct localized action caused 
by a bullet penetrating glass and the localized deflection of the net of a tennis 
raclet when striking a tennis ball to the effects caused by a projectile upon a 
beam or slab. Wessman and Rose (11, pp. 101-102) stated: 
Original span length has no significance in calculating initial 
bending moments due to an equivalent static load based on 
initia.!J. deflection. Presumably, the beam would eventually 
vibrate as a whole and assume a deflection curve associated 
with the fundamental mode, ... but it is the initial effects 
which are of major concern to the engineer. Values of ~ 
rthe length of beam subjected to localized bendingl 0 0. 
are very small in comparison with actual span lengths. 
Just what significance may be attached to this beyond empha-
sizing the initial localized action is a matter for debate. 
21 
H. Field Observations 
In an effort to obtain actual field data as to the effects of exploding projectiles 
on protective structures, the questionnaire and cover letter shown in Appendix B 
were mailed to selected Engineer Battalion Commanders in the Republic of 
Vietnam. Units were selected in an effort to obtain information from all areas of 
the country from the Demilitarized Zone to the Mekong Delta. Although response 
to the inquiries was good, only one contained sufficient information upon which 
comments could be made or a comparison could be made with theoretical values. 
Captain P. B. Hassman (22 ), Assistant Operations Officer of the 20th Engineer 
Battalion, 18th Engineer Brigade, reported on the effects of a direct hit by a 
122mm rocket. His information is shown pictorially in Figure 2. The cratering 
effects of this projectile, in rock of 3 -in. diameter or less, compare with those 
observed by the writer during his tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The 
"funnel tip" phenomenon is peculiar to rockets. This, also, was observed by the 
writer, although the observed impact areas were limited to compacted areas, such 
as unsurfaced roads and airstrips. In these cases the "funnel tip" was not as deep 
as that shown in Figure 2. The average depth was about 12 to 15 inches depending 
on the degree of compaction. In addition, the angle of the "funnel tip" to the 
vertical was larger indicating a greater firing range. Application of the basic 
laws of motion provide an apparent and logical, though not positively established, 
explanation of this phenomenon. In the case of an exploding mortar or artillery 
Res~lting ~rate~fr: ~recti H1t• 122mm__ _ _ ~~ 
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round, the mass approaches zero almost instantaneously upon detonation. The 
rocket, on the other hand, does not lose the majority of its mass upon detonation 
of the high explosive in the warhead. The trailing portion, which contained the 
now expended propellent charge, is not fragmented and continues to travel until 
stopped by the material upon which the rocket lands. The effects of the 
explosive warhead of rockets are similar to those of an artillery projectile with 
an equivalent amount of explosive; however, the propellant tube must be stopped 
prior to penetrating the actual structure. Obviously a more impervious barrier, 
than that formed by small rocks and uncompacted earth, must be provided. Rocks 
of 6 to 8-in. diameter or tightly bound logs placed near the top of the cover have 
been suggested (1, chap. 3, pp. 11-12). 
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III. DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL PROCEDURES 
A rigorous design of protective structures involves several complex parameters. 
First, a design round must be selected and the physical properties of the explosive 
and the geometry of the explosive charge contained therein must be known. Second, 
soil pressures at the base of the overhead cover, as evaluated by the Boussinesq 
equation, or similar procedure, are questionable and afford only an approximation 
of the depth of soil required to reduce the overpressure to a level which would 
cause deflections within the elastic range of the structural member. Finally, the 
determination of the deflection caused by the dynamic load becomes very involved, 
as the solution of the differential equations of motion is not a simple task. The 
assumption of a triangular pulse probably closely approximates the actual pulse 
of an explosion. However, for surface detonation of rounds which impact at some 
angle other than vertical, the percentage of the pulse which may be reflected, 
rather than transmitted into the cover, and the percentage of explosive energy used 
to rupture the shell casing affect the selection of the maximum amplitude of the 
pulse. In addition, this type of structure would certainly be subjected to consid-
erable damping, caused by the earth cover, and this would affect the solution of 
the equations of motion, and the selection of a Dynamic Load Factor. 
The number and complexity of the variables involved would make procedures 
for rigorous design of protective structures too unwieldy for most military 
engineers to use quickly and effectively. 
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The destructive effects of surface detonated explosive projectiles, as applied 
to protective structures, may be nullified rather simply by using an adequate depth 
of overhead cover on the structure. Assuming energy dissipation into the atmos-
phere 'md utilizing the energy absorbing characteristics of wood and loose earth, 
determination of the design load for the structure may be greatly simplified by 
considering only two variables; the minimum depth of cover required and the unit 
weight of the soil. This minimum depth of cover, in final form, will include the 
radius of destruction of the explosive charge, an additional amount to absorb metal 
fragments and perhaps a factor of safety, as specified by the local commander. 
In any case, it should exceed the measured depth or radius of the true crater 
caused by the design round in the local soil, and must be sufficiently deep to 
prevent a possible punching shear failure mechanism. 
Theoretical values for the radius of destruction may be obtained from 
Equations 3 and 6, and, in general, would be expected to be larger than those 
observed in apparent craters. 
In using Equation 3, if surface detonation is assumed the proportion of 
charge below the ground surface, /3 , would be zero. This would give a value for 
radius of destruction equal to zero. A value for {3 of one-tenth should be con-
servative, especially if the round is fused to detonate upon impact. A value for 
0 may then be determined by interpolation between L 0 and 3. 50. For earth, a 
is o. 7. The radius of destruction of an 8lmm mortar round, with a charge 
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weight of 2.1 pounds of Composition B explosive is calculated, using Equation 3, 
as follows: 
6 = 3. 50 - f3 (3. 50-1. 00) 
= 3.50- 0.1(2.50) 
=3.50-0.25 
= 3.25 
= 1.13 feet 
The total depth of destruction may then be determined based on the assumed depth 
of penetration, i.e., one-tenth of the charge length, and the distance from the 
center of gravity of the explosive charge to the nose of the round, as shown in 
Equation 4. Consideration of these factors will usually give values for the total 
depth of destruction which exceed the calculated value for R. 
As previously stated, the Breaching Formula was derived for TNT. In order 
to use the revised formula, Equation 6, the Relative Effectiveness of the explosive 
used to that of TNT must be considered. For Composition B, the Relative 
Effectiveness is 1.35 (13, pp. 83-84). Assuming surface detonation, C = 2.3 for 
an untamped explosive and for good timber/earth construction K may be taken as 
0.23 (13, p. 97). The radius of destruction for the 81mm mortar round is 
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calculated, using Equation 6, as follows: 
R='"'3~ VIZC 
= 
= 1. 75 feet 
A 155mm artillery round contains approximately 15.34 pounds of Composition 
B explosive. Using the above assumed conditions, the radius of destruction is 
determined by Equations 3 and 6 to be 2.19 and 3.39 feet, respectively. 
There is a relatively large difference between the values for radius of 
destruction calculated by Equation 3 and those obtained from Equation 6. One 
reason is that in Equation 3 no specific consideration is given to the Relative 
Effectiveness of Composition B. It seems reasonable to assume that this equa-
tion was based on the effects of the explosive TNT, due to the period (1935-1942) 
in which it is reported to have been widely used. If the Relative Effectiveness of 
Composition B explosive is included in Equation 3, the calculated value for R for the 
81 mm mortar round is increased from 1.13 feet to 1. 2 5 feet and the R for the 
155mm round is inc rea sed from 2. 19 to 2. 43 feet. The calculated values for R and 
the average observed apparent crater depth and radius, for the vertical and forty-
five degree orientation from Table II, are shown in Table III. 
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Table III. Calculated Radius of Destruction 
and Observed Apparent Crater Radius. 
81mm 155mm 
R, using Equation 3, with no 
consideration of the Relative 1.13 feet 2.19 feet 
Effectiveness of Composition B. 
R, using Equation 3, considering 
Composition B as 1. 35 times as 1. 25 feet 2. 43 feet 
effective as TNT. 
Observed Apparent Crater Depth Depth = 0. 85 feet Depth = 1. 13 feet 
and Radius from Table II. Radius = 1. 62 5 feet Radius = 3. 05 feet 
R, using Equation 6, considering 
the Relative Effectiveness of 1. 75 feet 3. 39 feet 
Composition B. 
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No definite conclusions can be drawn from the above table, since the observed 
craters were in a cohesionless soil and the data is for apparent craters rather than 
radius of destruction, as calculated using Equations 3 and 6. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the two equations seem to bracket the observed apparent 
crater radius. Equation 3 gives a theoretical value of R, which is about 30 to 40 
percent less than the observed apparent crater radius. Equation 6 gives a 
theoretical value which is about 8 to 11 percent greater than the observed apparent 
crater radius. This tends to reinforce the idea of making an on-the-spot crater 
analysis in the field, and selecting the larger value of measured radius and 
calculated R. 
The values for R, calculated using the two equations, differ by approximately 
40 percent. The density and detonating velocity of the TNT, or perhaps even less 
effective explosive, used in the development of the equation for radius of destruction 
(Equation 3) may partially account for the differences in material factors and 
tamping factors used in the two equations. Selection of the tamping factor would, 
of course, depend on the soil characteristics where development tests were 
conducted. Selection of the material factor could have been based on tht: manner 
in which this factor is used in the two basic equations. In the case of Equation 3, 
it might be expected that attention was focused on the effects of a single bomb at 
a time, whereas, in the development of Equation 5, consideration may have been 
given to the fact that normally several charges, placed in a row, would be used 
to destroy a timber and earth wall. The combined effects of several charges, 
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detonated simultaneously, could account for the smaller value of 0. 23 used as the 
material factor in the Breaching Formula. Still another reason for the differences 
in magnitude of these factors is the geometry of the explosive charge. In the case 
of bombs or artillery projectiles, one usually visualizes a long, cylindrical 
charge, whereas in the application of Equation 5, one thinks of making the 
required size charge by stacking blocks of TNT, or other explosive, against the 
object to be destroyed. The relatively small cross sectional area of the pro-
jectile and longer period of explosion pulse, as compared to the greater cross 
sectional area and probably shorter period of explosion pulse in the breaching 
charge, may account for the differences in the material and tamping factors used 
in the two equations. Finally, the assumption that only that portion of the bomb's 
explosive charge below the ground surface contributes to the cratering effect is 
questionable. A tamping coefficient and coefficient for the medium in which 
detonation takes place, based on this assumption, would differ considerably from 
those selected in another manner. As a basis for checking experimental results, 
both Equation 3 and 6 were solved for various values of P. The results are shown 
graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 is a plot of Equation 3, where for 
Composition B: 
and for TNT: 
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Figure 4 is a plot of Equation 6, where for Composition B: 
R= 
and for TNT: 
R= 
.35 X P 
0.23 x2.3 
Composition B is the explosive commonly contained in many mortar and conven-
tional artillery rounds. TNT was used in this investigation for field testing on 
full-scale mock-ups. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The experimental procedures of the investigation were divided into two parts. 
The first part consisted of the design and testing of a small-scale protective 
structure. In the second part the procedures and results of the first were 
extended to a full-scale structure. 
A. Small-Scale Protective Structures 
The first step of this portion was to select a charge and determine its radius 
of destruction. The selected charge was a Hercules, Number 6, non-electric, 
blasting cap. This type charge was chosen because its cylindrical shape 
approximates that of an artillery or mortar round. Its relatively small size, the 
equivalent of approximately 7 grains of PETN, allowed it to be fired near buildings 
without endangering people or property. As a safety precaution, however, a 
firing box (Fig. 5) was constructed. All live firings were conducted in this box 
and observations were made through the plexiglass side. The inside dimensions 
of 9 in. by 9 in. were chosen to accomodate either a square baking pan filled with 
gelatin or a small-scale protective structure. 
The first series of live firings involved observation of the cratering effect 
of an exploding blasting cap on gelatin covered with increasing depths of earth 




Figure 5. Plywood and Plexiglass Firing Box. 
gelatin. As expected, severe cratering and permanent distortion of the gelatin 
was noted (Figs. 6, 7). For the second shot, a 1/4-in. deep layer of sand was 
placed on top of a new pan of gelatin and the firing repeated. The resultant true 
crater in the gelatin measured 2-1/2 in. in diameter and 1-1/2 in. deep. A 
third shot was made with a 1/2-in. deep layer of sand on the gelatin. The 
resulting true crater size was determined to be 1-1/2 in. in diameter and 
slightly less than 1 in. deep. For shot four, 3/4 in. of sand cover was used. 
The true crater was observed to be 1-1/4 in. in diameter and 1/2 in. deep 
(Figs. 8, 9 ). Shots five and six were made with corresponding increases in 
depths of sand cover. The resulting true crater which followed shot six was 
3/8 in. in diameter and 1/8 in. deep for a sand cover of 1-1/4 in. From this it 
was predicted that for 1-1/2 in. of sand cover, there should be no visible 
damage to the gelatin. This prediction proved accurate, as shown in Figures 
10 and 11. Additional tests were not conducted to determine the absolute 
minimum depth of sand, between 1-1/4 in. and 1-1/2 in., required to prevent 
damage to the gelatin, since it is reasonable to assume that an absolute 
minimum depth of cover will not be used on the prototype. The relationship 
observed between the depth of true crater in gelatin and depth of sand cover is 
shown in Figure 12. 
There are 7000 grains per pound, so the weight of the explosive charge in 
the blasting cap may be taken as 0. 001 pounds. PETN is 1. 66 times as 
effective as TNT. Using these values with Equation 3: 
37 
• ...... o T - I • NO _,__ c::.,ao.-.._ 
Figure 6. Blasting Cap in Contact with Gel atin. 
Figure 7. Crater in Unprotected Gelatin. 
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Figure 8. Partially Protected Gelatin. 
Figure 9. Crater in Partially Protected Gelatin. 
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F~gure 10. Crater in Protective Cover. 
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= 2. 5 0.1 xl.66x 0.001 0. 7 X 3. 25 
=0.105feet 
= 1. 2 6 inches 
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This value is 16 percent less than the measured radius of destruction for sand and 
gelatin, but seems to compare favorably when considering all the assumptions made 
in order to use the equation. 
Using Equation 6 and the Relative Effectiveness of PETN, the radius of 
destruction is determined as: 
R = ,3JL"" VKC: 
= 
. 66 X 0. 001 
0.23x2.3 
= 0.146 feet 
= 1. 75 inches 
This value is almost 17 percent higher than the measured radius of destruction, 
but could serve well as a "built-in" factor of safety. 
As observed previously, in Table III, the experimentally determined radius 
of destruction is bracketed by the theoretical values obtained using Equations 3 
and 6. 
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Based on the sand and gelatin tests and the calculated values of R, small-
scale protective structures were constructed and tests conducted to determine 
whether 1-1/2 in. of sand cover would prevent a punching shear failure when the 
blasting cap was detonated on top of the structure. The selected structure was 
assumed to represent a small guard bunker, 9 ft by 9 ft in size. To limit the 
area of failure to the roof, which seems to be the most critical area, the posts 
and caps were made of l-in. by l-in. balsa wood and the diagonal braces were 
1/2-in. by 1/2-in. balsa wood. This substructure had sufficient strength to 
limit failures to roof sections and was used for all small-scale tests (Fig. 13). 
The first series of tests assumed a simple, solid-deck roof of planks laid 
from cap to cap and covered with sand. With 1-1/2 in. of sand cover, the 
blasting cap caused no visible damage to the decking (Fig. 14). A failure was 
observed when the sand cover was reduced to 3/4 in. (Figs. 15, 16). Since the 
purpose of this test was to establish that failure would not occur with 1-1/2 in. 
of sand cover, further tests were not performed to determine the limiting 
protective depth, between 3/4 in. and 1-1/2 in. 
The next series of tests assumed a stringer-roof superstructure, upon 
which decking and sand cover would be placed (Fig. 17). This small-scale bunker 
is shown before and after the test firing with 1-1/2 in. of cover in Figures 18 and 
19. The results of the second shot are shown in Figure 20. For this shot, only 
l-in. of sand cover was used on the structure. No damage was observed in this 
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Figure 13 . Substructure Used for Small-8cale Testing. 
Figure 14. Undamaged Solid-Deck Roof. 
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Figure 15. Damaged Solid-DeckRoof. 
Figure 16. Damaged Solid-Deck Roof. 
Figure 1 7. Small-Scale Bunker, Stringer-Roof Superstructure. 
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Figur e 18. Bunker With Adequate Cover. 
Figure 19. Undamaged Small-Scale Structure. 
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case. Since the cap was directly over the center stringer, probably that stringer 
was able to absorb the increased load. In an actual situation, the round cannot 
be assumed to impact directly over a stringer, therefore, a third shot was made 
with the blasting cap offset from the stringer. The cover used in this test was 
1-1/4 in. and, as anticipated, failure occurred (Fig. 21). 
For the final series of tests on small-scale bunkers another stringer-roof 
superstructure was assumed. The planks and stringers used in this case were 
much smaller than those previously used and a failure was expected if the cover 
on this structure was less than 1-1/2 in. In fact, there was some doubt that a 
failure would be prevented by the 1-1/2 in. of cover, due to the small size of the 
stringers and the decking. However, as shown in Figures 22 and 23, no damage 
was done to the structure as long as the cover was 1-1/2 in. This structure was 
subjected to a total of three shots without an observed failure. 
B. Full-Scale Structures 
From the results of the first portion of the experimental investigation it was 
tentatively concluded that failures may be prevented, and adequate protection for 
personnel assured, by providing a minimum depth of cover equal to or greater 
than the radius of destruction of the explosive charge. To substantiate the theory 
that only the uniformly distributed dead load caused by the minimum depth of 
overhead cover need be considered when determining the size and spacing of 
Figure 20. Undamaged Bunker--Blasting Cap Detonated Over 
a. Structural Member. 
Figure 21. Damage to Small-Scale Bunker--Inadequate 
Protective Cover. 
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Figure 22. Undamaged Small-Scale Structure, With 
Adequate Cover. 
Figure 23. Undamaged Small-Scale Structure--Adequate Cover. 
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structural members, further tests were conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. 
These tests were similar to those using the blasting cap, gelatin and small-
scale structures. A series of 4-pound charges of TNI' were detonated on the sur-
face of the soil at the test site. The true craters had an average depth of 11 in. 
and an average radius of 21 in. The average unit weight of the soil was determined 
to be 104.3 pcf. The radius of destruction for a 4-pound charge of TNT was cal-
culated using both equations for R. Using Equation 3, R was calculated to be 17 
in., and using Equation 6, R was calculated to be 23.5 in. Again, the theoretical 
values of R tend to bracket the observed R. 
A typical protective structure was assumed. One common size often used for 
guard bunkers is 8 ft. by 8 ft. Two different roof sections were constructed. The 
first was designed to support the depth of earth indicated by Equation 3, and will 
hereafter be referred to as "Bunker 1." The second roof section was designed 
to support the depth of earth indicated by Equation 6, and will hereafter be referred 
to as "Bunker 2 . " 
For the first shot on each bunker, the depth of earth used was determined by 
increasing the calculated values of R by 15 percent. This was based on the 
assumption that some additional earth would be used to absorb metal fragments 
from an actual exploding projectile. The two roof sections were designed to 
support 20 in. and 27 in. of earth, respectively. The unsupported span length 
of the stringers was 7 ft, and the unit weight of the soil was 104.3 pcf. 
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Materials available for construction were assumed to be limited to nominal 2 x 12 
planks. Spacing of the roof stringers was determined by considering the properties 
of the soil and the properties of the materials to be used in construction. The 
actual dimensions of the members were 1-1/2 in. by 11-1/2 in. Using the section 
modulus of the member and the allowable flexural and horizontal shear stresses 
for the grade and species of lumber, it was determined that four stringers would 
be needed for Bunker 1 and five stringers would be required for Bunker 2. 
One of the problems which originally led to this investigation was encountered 
in the design of these roof sections. When the construction materials were 
purchased, the grade and species of lumber was described as Number 2, Southern 
Pine having an allowable flexural stress, f, of 1200 psi and an allowable horizon-
tal shear stress, H, of 105 psi. However, when the materials arrived at the 
construction site, it was observed that the planks selected for stringers were 
Number 1, Dense, KD, Southern Pine, with an allowable f of 1700 psi and an 
allowable H of 120 psi. Both bunkers were quickly redesigned, based on the dead 
load of soil, and it was determined that the number of stringers in each section 
could be reduced by one. Three stringers, spaced 45 in. center-to-center, were 
used for Bunker 1 and four stringers, spaced 32 in. center-to-center, were used 
for Bunker 2 (Figs. 24, 25). 
A 4-pound charge of TNT was detonated on each roof without failure of any of 
the structural members (Figs. 26, 27, 28 and 29). A failure was not anticipated 
in the roof section covered with 27 in. of earth, since small-scale tests had 
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Figure 24. Full-8cale Bunker 1. 
Figure 25. Full-8cale Bunker 2. 
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Figure 26. Bunker 1--Before Firing. 
Figure 2 7. Bunker 1--After Firing. 
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Figure 28. Bunker 2--Before Firing. 
Figure 29. Bunker 2--After Firing. 
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indicated that no failure would occur when the actual depth of cover exceeded the 
measured R, in this case 21 in. A failure was expected in the roof section 
covered with only 20 in. of earth due to the fact that even with a 15 percent increase 
in R, calculated using Equation 3, the depth of cover was less than the measured 
R of 21 in. 
It was originally intended to conduct additional tests using a minimum depth 
of earth cover on the structures. The intended cover for the respective roof 
sections was to be 17 in. and 23.5 in., the R calculated using Equations 3 and 6. 
Since Bunker 1, the roof section with three stringers, covered with only 20 in. 
of earth was not damaged, it seemed reasonable to assume that Bunker 2, the roof 
section with four stringers, covered with 23.5 in. of earth would not be damaged. 
Therefore, further testing was limited to Brmker 1. 
A test on Bunker 1 with 17 in. of cover was conducted. Weather conditions 
on the day of this test, while typical of what must be anticipated in an actual 
situation, caused considerable difficulty. The soil cover was almost saturated 
and this increased the dead load on the structure by as much as 25-35 percent. 
A failure was anticipated, since the depth of cover was 4 in. less than the 
observed true crater radius and the dead load on the structure was greater due to 
the increased moisture content of the soil. In general, the actual failure was 
confined to the area directly under the explosive charge. The two pieces of 
decking directly under the charge were severely damaged with both flexural and 
shear failures being noted. None of the stringers were damaged; however, the 
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structure displaced sideways and the stringers rotated until their 11-1/2 in. 
dimension was in a horizontal orientation. This very localized failure could have 
been prevented by providing a greater depth of earth for cover over the structure. 
In the case of this particular roof section, an addition of only 3 in. of earth 
should have provided sufficient depth to prevent failure. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although sufficient data was not obtained to provide statistical analysis, 
the basic concept appears valid. Since testing, using actual impacting and 
exploding projectiles, must be performed to completely confirm the concept, 
further tests with static detonations of TNT were not conducted. Based on 
the data. and results obtained within the limits of the investigation the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
1. The basic concept of providing a minimum depth of earth cover for a 
given explosive charge is valid. 
2. The very short duration of a surface detonated explosion pulse and 
the energy absorbing characteristics of loose soil work to the designer's 
advantage. Protective structures, subject to attack by the type and size 
projectiles assumed in this investigation may be designed by considering 
the dead load of the soil and the mechanical and physical properties of the 
timbers used for the structure. Appropriate adjustments in allowable stresses 
and factors of safety applied to the dead load provide an even greater degree 
of protection. 
3. Loose dry soil, contained by sandbag retainer walls,has better energy 
absorbing characteristics and reduces construction time, as compared to 
overhead cover composed entirely of partially filled sandbags. The added 
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confinement of the soil, due to the individual sandbags, may appreciably 
increase the load transmitted to the structural members. In addition, nearly 
saturated earth has very poor energy absorbing characteristics. 
4. Graphs showing required depth of cover versus explosive charge and 
the measured unit weight of the soil to be used for the overhead cover provide 
a quick and easily understood method of determining the design load for the 
structure and greatly simplify design, or changes in design, of protective 
structures. 
5. The revised Breaching Formula gives conservative values for the 
radius of destruction, R. Use of this equation could lead to over-designed 
protective structures and excessive use of materials. 
6. The measured radius of destruction, as determined by the crater 
analysis, provides a good check on the calculated value of R; as the general 
terms for material factor, included in Equations 3 and 6, may not apply to 
the particular soil used for the overhead cover. The depth of cover used on 
the protective structure should not be less than the measured radius of 
destruction. 
7. Values of R obtained from the equation for radius of destruction of a 
bomb may be inadequate if used without a factor of safety. Although tests 
conducted during this investigation were generally successful, the assumptions 
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made in the use of this equation may not apply to different soils or an actual 
exploding projectile. The assumption, that only the portion of the charge 
below the ground surface contributes to cratering, used in the derivation of 
this expression is not valid. Some cratering must be anticipated, even in the 
case of surface detonated explosive charges. However, this equation does 
consider penetration of the projectile, weight of explosive charge, a tamping 
coefficient, and a coefficient for the medium in which detonation takes place. 
As such it could be used to begin an investigation which deals with fuse-delay 
projectiles. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
As in many cases, during the course of this research several questions 
or problems arose which, although pertinent, were beyond the scope of this 
investigation. Although the data and results substantiate the concept for rapid 
field design, the limitations of time and facilities precluded tests or study of 
related problems. 
The following are recommendations for further study and continued re-
search in conjunction with the design of protective structures: 
1. The basic concept should be field tested, using actual explosive pro-
jectiles. The short duration of the surface detonated explosion pulse causes 
practically negligible deflections in the structural members; however, the 
kinetic energy of the impacting round may be sufficiently large to cause 
flexural failures within the few milliseconds between impact and actual deton-
ation of the explosive contained in the projectile. 
2. The explosive effects of rockets appear to be no more severe than any 
other explosive projectile of comparable size. The propellant tube of the 
rocket is not fragmented upon detonation of the explosive warhead and continues 
to travel until stopped by the earth cover on the protective structure. A study 
of the most efficient materials for use as a barrier against this propellant tube 
and the location of this barrier, i.e. , near the top or bottom of the overhead 
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cover, would be beneficial. 
3. Equations 3 and 6 both contain terms which consider a tamped, or 
confined, explosion pulse. The increased radius of destruction of a fuse-
delay projectile may be obtained by using different tamping coefficients in 
these equations. However, this is the relatively simple part of a design 
problem dealing with fuse-delay projectiles. The period of time between 
initiation and actual detonation may range from several milliseconds to 
several minutes. The amount of penetration will depend on the impact velocity, 
the composition of the overhead cover and the properties of the materials used 
in the cover. In order to prepare a graph of Minimum Depth of Cover versus 
Explosive Charge applicable to fuse-delay projectiles, the radius of destruction 
of a confined explosion pulse must be increased by the amount of penetration 
prior to detonation. This could provide areas for at least two additional in-
vestigations, i.e., penetration in cohesionless soils and penetration in cohe-
sive soils. 
4. The impact kinetic energy of the projectile, prior to detonation of a 
fuse-delay shell, is transmitted to the structural members, but just how much 
this energy might be attenuated by the loose soil in the overhead cover provides 





Dynamic Load Factor for Explosion Pulse 
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In order to determine the deflection of a member subjected to a dynamic 
load one must know the natural period, T , of the structure, the duration and 
N 
maximum amplitude of the dynamic load and the shape of the pulse. Deter-
ruination of the natural period of the structure is not difficult, but for structures 
similar to those being investigated a rough estimate of one to ten seconds for 
the natural period would probably provide sufficiently acceptable results upon 
which to choose or determine a Dynamic Load Factor. An explosion is ideally 
assumed to cause a triangular pulse and the duration of this pulse may be deter-




t =the duration of the pulse, in seconds . 
.t = the length of the explosive charge, in feet. 
D = the detonating velocity of the explosive, in feet per second. 
(1) 
The Dynamic Load Factor may be determined analytically by solving the dif-
ferential equation of motion for a structure subjected to a triangular pulse, or 
it may be taken from a graph similar to that presented by Biggs (7). For a 
triangular pulse, this graph gives the Dynamic Load Factor for various ratios 
of time of pulse to natural period, t/T N" After selecting a Dynamic Load 
Factor, the deflection due to a static load equal in magnitude to the maximum 
amplitude of the dynamic load may be determined using the usual equations 
for deflection. The product of the deflection, so determined, and the Dynamic 
Load Factor is the deflection caused by the dynamic load. 
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In the particular case of explosion loading, difficulty is encountered in 
choosing a Dynamic Load Factor. For example, if the explosive charge is 
one foot long and has a detonating velocity of 20, 000 fps, Equation 1 gives a 
time of pulse, t, of: 
t == 2.f = 2 X 1, 0 ft 
D 20, 000 fps 
-4 10 seconds 
The assumption of 20, 000 fps for the detonating velocity is conservative. 
Most of the high explosives used in the military have a detonating velocity 
of from 23,000 to 26,000 fps. Assuming an approximate natural period for 
the structure of one second, the ratio of time of pulse to natural period, 
-4 
t/T N , is 10 . 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' graph, as presented by Biggs and 
shown in Fig. 30, shows a Dynamic Load Factor of about 0. 16 for a value 
of t/T equal to 0. 05. It seems reasonable to assume a much smaller value 
N 
-4 -5 
of Dynamic Load Factor for values of t/T N in the range of 10 to 10 . If 
the graph is extrapolated for smaller ratios of time of pulse to natural period, 
the Dynamic Load Factor approaches very small values for ratios between 
10-3 and 10-4 (Fig. 31). Selection of a reliable Dynamic Load Factor, based 
on this extrapolation, is difficult. An expression which gives an approximation 
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Figure 31. Extrapolated Values of Dynamic Load Factor for Very Small 





-4 For a t/T N of 10 the Dynamic Load Factor is 0. 000314. 
As an example, consider a timber beam, 10ft long, subjected toady-
namic load caused by the explosive charge discussed above. Considering the 
density and detonating velocity, the maximum explosion pressure is approx-
imately 1. 5 x 106 psi. Assuming an area of influence on the structure of 
30 sq. in., the maximum amplitude of the explosion pulse is 45 x 106 lb. 
Assuming a value of E for timber of 1. 5 x 106 psi, a moment of inertia of 
the beam of 103 in. 4 and considering the load as being concentrated at mid-
span, the static deflection is computed as follows: 
X t t• saw 
PL3 
=-48EI 
45 X 106 lb. X 1728 X 103 in. 3 
= 
48 X 1.5 X 106 psi X 103 in. 
4 
= 108 inches. 
(8) 
Multiplying X . by the Dynamic Load Factor of 0. 000314, the deflection 
static 
due to the dynamic load is determined to be 0. 034 in. , which is certainly 
within the elastic range of the member. 
By proper spacing of members, the designer can insure that the dynamic 
deflection and deflection caused by the earth cover does not exceed the maximum 







Box 52, Route 1 
Rolla, Mo. 65401 
The purpose of this letter is to ask your assistance in gathering field data 
for possible use in preparing my thesis toward a Master of Science Degree in 
Civil Engineering. I am presently enrolled at the University of Missouri -
Rolla, under the Army's Graduate School Program. Having returned from 
Vietnam last November, I am fully aware that your time is extremely valuable. 
Although my letter is lengthy, the information I am requesting is fairly concise. 
During my tour with the 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division, 
I served as Commanding Officer of Company A, and later as Assistant S-3 of 
the Battalion. We had access to Standard Designs, complete with bill of mater-
ials, for structures which could be used as Tactical Operations Centers or any-
thing else the tactical commander desired. These, we assumed, had been 
designed with all factors considered, including suspected or probable enemy 
incoming mortar and/or artillery rounds. 
Only once, during my tour, was the responsible supply officer able to fill 
the required BOM as presented in the Standard Designs. Rather, the materials 
received were normally of reduced dimensions and in smaller quantities than 
originally requisitioned. The economics of having a standard design and stick-
ing to it are not in question; however, my experience was that even though the 
required materials were not on hand the tactical commander needed his TOC as 
soon as possible. This, then, forced the engineer, in conjunction with the 
tactical commander, to redesign the final structure based on his experience and 
the available materials. When the job was completed, that ego deflating ques-
tion, "Will it take a direct hit from a round?", caused some embarrass-
ment to many of us. To the best of my knowledge, none of our structures failed 
during enemy mortar, rocket or artillery attacks, but I'm still concerned that 
we engineers were not able to positively answer the question on the spot. 
This is the subject I propose to investigate for my thesis. As you are 
aware, FM 5-34 does not contain a complete discussion of the variables involved 
in this type of structural dynamics problem. My plans are to try to identify these 
governing variables, e. g., weight of incoming round, weight and type of explosive 
contained therein, thickness and composition of overhead cover, span length of 
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structural members, etc., and provide some type of analytical guidelines for 
future use by combat engineer leaders. Hopefully this can be reduced even to 
terms and expressions which can be interpreted and used by all engineer lead-
ers, not just the structural engineers. 
As previously stated, my letter is long; however, I have presented to you 
the background concerning my topic of investigation. Your cooperation in com-
pleting the short questionnaire will be greatly appreciated. This data will aid 
in verifying or rejecting predictions based on textbook analysis. 
Perhaps, unknowingly, I have asked for some classified data. I hope this 
is not the case, but if some of the questions do deal with classified information, 
thus preventing you from completely answering the question, I will understand. 
My student status at UMR can be verified by contacting the Professor of Mili-
tary Science, University of Missouri - Rolla, Rolla, Missouri. Thank you for 
any assistant you may be able to provide. 
Sincerely, 
JOHN R. CHILDRESS 
Major, Corps of Engineers 
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain field data. concerning structures 
(primarily timber structures) built by combat engineer units in support of tac-
tical operations. The information will be used, in conjunction with research, to 
attempt to formulate guidelines and analytical techniques for use in the rapid 
field design of protective structures, built in the Theater of Operations. 
1. Number of protective structures, built by your unit, which sustained a dir-
ect hit from an enemy round. Please give a brief description of the extent of 
damage, if any. 
2. Size of the round and approximate range from which fired, e. g. 82mm mor-
tar, 1500 meters. 
3. Brief sketch, showing thickness and composition of overhead cover, size 
and span length of structural member, approximate location of impact, etc. 
4. Other information which, in your opinion, will aid in this research. 
A self-addressed, stamped, envelope is included for your use in returning 
this questionnaire. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated and could ma-
terially affect the outcome of this research. 
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